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xihucaibird

5月21日
Supply-chain management：Shrink rapped
Travel and tourism：Asia, beware Benidorm
Georgia and Russia：Gather round the gorge


词汇：
Benidorm：西班牙南部城市
Hellenic：adj.希腊的, 希腊人的, 希腊语的
tract：n.广阔的地面, 土地, 地方, 地域,
monstrosity：n. 巨大之物，怪异之物
halal: n.伊斯兰教律法的合法食物
Abkhazia 阿布哈慈（格鲁吉亚的一个自治州）
knout-rattling
ballot-stuffing n. 投票舞弊
paraphernalia： n.个人随身物品；装备，设备，配件：在某顶特定活动中所用的物件；装备
rap:n.叩击, 轻拍, 轻敲, 斥责
vt.敲, 拍, 打, 厉声说出, 斥责, 使着迷
proprietary：adj.所有的, 私人拥有的；n.所有者, 所有权

xihucaibird

5月22日
China and Tibet
A lama in sheep's clothing?
May 8th 2008 | DHARAMSALA
From The Economist print edition
Revered by Tibetans, reviled by China

NOT long after calling him a “devil” with a human face and the heart of a beast, Chinese officials are talking again to representatives of the Dalai Lama. But in the Indian hill town of Dharamsala, the seat of Tibet's government-in-exile, few believe China's own heart has changed. “The basis of their attitude towards Tibet is...distrust and fear,” the Dalai Lama told The Economist a day after a meeting on May 4th in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen between two of his envoys and two senior Communist Party officials. It was the first contact between the two sides since unrest broke out in Tibet and other ethnic Tibetan regions of China in March.
Both sides are anxious not to appear to be closing the door. Lodi Gyari, one of the Dalai Lama's representatives at the talks, described them as a “step in the right direction” and said more would be held, though no date has been announced. China said there could be further contact as long as the Dalai Lama showed “sincerity”. China's surprising decision to offer renewed talks seemed aimed at deflecting foreign criticism of its handling of Tibet ahead of the Beijing Olympics in August. But officials in Dharamsala are wary. They deny the Shenzhen meeting was a continuation of six rounds of confidence-building discussions held between 2002 and July 2007. Rather, it was an “emergency conversation” about the present crisis. Mr Gyari said only the next round of talks would count as the resumption of a formal dialogue.
The Tibetans had several demands: an end to the clampdown in Tibet, including the withdrawal of security forces from monasteries; no more “patriotic education” requiring monks to denounce the Dalai Lama; an investigation by an international body into the causes of the unrest; the release of political detainees; and fair trials for those accused of rioting.
None of this will be heard sympathetically by China. The state-controlled press is still vilifying the Dalai Lama and the authorities have maintained a tight grip on Tibetan regions. Visits by foreign journalists remain largely banned and foreign tourists are barred. Late last month, at secret trials in Lhasa, 30 people were sentenced to prison terms of between three years and life for their role in rioting in March. Human Rights Watch, a monitoring organisation in New York, said lawyers in Beijing who offered to represent them were warned by the Ministry of Justice that their licences might be revoked.
The Dalai Lama tries to sound conciliatory. Tibetans, he says, should be proud that China is hosting the Olympics (though, with a characteristic chuckle, he says he does not know whether they will be happy when the Olympic torch is paraded in Lhasa in June). He says he fully supports a “one-China policy”, but that the future of Taiwan should be decided by its own people—which is anathema to China. The Dalai Lama says he is not so concerned about redrawing Tibet's political boundaries to include all ethnic Tibetan areas adjoining it (an idea he once backed strongly, to China's horror). The priority, he says, is to protect the culture and environment of Tibetans. But China will want a stronger retraction than this. It believes the Dalai Lama is still intent on carving out a single Tibetan territory covering a quarter of China's land area.
According to the Dalai Lama, Chinese officials accepted in 2006 during the fifth round of talks that he was sincere in his insistence that Tibet should be part of China. But by the sixth round last year their attitude had hardened. Some of the Dalai Lama's officials say China took fright at signs of his continuing sway over Tibetans in China and his readiness to use it—for example, to persuade them to stop wearing the skins of endangered animals and worshipping Dorje Shugden, a cultic deity.
China's crackdown on the recent unrest in Tibet may limit the Dalai Lama's flexibility in dealing with China. The streets of Dharamsala in the Himalayan foothills are full of Tibetan flags flown in sympathy with Tibetans in China. Ubiquitous gruesome pictures show Tibetans shot by Chinese security forces. The Dalai Lama says there has been “a lot of criticism” of his conciliatory negotiating stand with China. He says he remains fully committed to his approach in spite of recent events. So too, however, does China.
中国和西藏
披着羊皮的喇嘛？
受藏人尊重，遭中国唾弃
不久前刚称达赖喇嘛是个人面兽心的“恶魔”，中国官员又开始同达赖喇嘛代表进行会谈。但是，在印度山区城镇达兰萨拉，也就是西藏流亡政府的基地，没有人相信中国改变了自己的心意。“他们对待西藏的基本态度就是……不信任和惧怕”，5月4日在中国南部城市深圳举行会谈后的第二天，达赖喇嘛对《经济学人》如是说。此次与会的双方是代表达赖的两名使者和中共的两名高级官员。这是今年3月中国西藏和其他藏族地区爆发骚乱以来双方的首次接触。
双方都急于表示他们没有向对方关闭谈判的大门。Lodi Gyari，参加会谈的达赖代表之一，将会谈描述为“是朝着正确的方向迈进的一步”，并表示双方会进行更多的谈话，但是没有宣布具体时间。中国方面表示只要达赖喇嘛表示出“诚意”，他们之间会有更多接触。中国决定同达赖进行新的会谈有些出人意料，似乎是为了转移国际社会对其在西藏事件上的处理的批评，特别是北京将在八月份举办奥运会。但是在达兰萨拉的流亡政府官员很警惕。他们否认深圳会谈是2002年至2007年间举行的建立互信的六轮谈话的继续；而是对于当前危机的一次“紧急对话”。Gyari先生说，在这之后进行的谈话才可以算是继续正式会谈。
西藏人有一些要求：结束在西藏的镇压，包括从寺院撤出安全部队；不再对僧人进行“爱国教育”，要求他们谴责达赖喇嘛；允许国际组织对此次骚乱的起因进行调查；释放被扣押的政治犯；以及对被控参与暴乱的人进行公正的审讯。
中国可不会同意上述任何要求。国家控制的媒体仍然在诋毁达赖喇嘛，当局也紧紧控制着西藏地区。外国记者基本上都不允许进入，外国游客更是被禁止。上月底，在拉萨进行了多次秘密审讯，30个人因为参加3月份的骚乱被判3年至终身不等的监禁。一个总部位于纽约的监督组织，人权观察说那些主动要求代表这些人的北京律师都受到司法部警告，他们的律师执照可能会被吊销。
达赖喇嘛试图表现让自己听起来温和些。他说，西藏人应该对中国主办奥运会感到自豪（但是，以他那特有的一笑，他又说不肯定他们是否欢迎七月份火炬在拉萨传递）。他表示他完全支持“一个中国政策”，但是台湾的未来应该由该地区的人民自行决定，这是中国极力反对的。达赖说不一定考虑重新划分西藏的政治边界以包括周边的所有藏族聚居区（他曾经坚决支持这种做法，另中国很担心）。他说，最重要的是保护藏族文化和环境。但中国期待看到达赖更激烈的反应。它始终认为达赖仍意图从中国分裂出一个面积占其领土四分之一的独立藏族区。
据达赖喇嘛称，在2006年的第五轮会谈时，中方官员表示达赖在主张西藏是中国的一部分上是真诚的。但是到去年的第六轮会谈时，双方的态度强硬起来。追随达赖喇嘛一些官员称中国害怕看到达赖始终对藏人有着影响力，他也准备利用这种影响力，譬如，他可以说服藏人不再用濒危的动物的皮毛制衣服，停止崇拜邪教神Dorje Shugden。
中国对近期发生在西藏的暴力事件的镇压可能限制了达赖喇嘛同中国政府交涉的灵活度。位于喜马拉雅山脚的达兰萨拉的街道上满是飘着的藏旗，表达对在中国的藏人同胞的同情。到处是藏人被中国安全部队射杀的令人惊骇的照片。达赖喇嘛说他同中方谈判时的妥协立场遭到了很多批评。他表示，尽管近来发生了这些事，他还是会坚持自己的方式。而中国同样也是。

Anathema n.诅咒, 咒逐, [宗]革出教门, 被咒逐的人(物)
Ubiquitous adj. 到处存在的, (同时)普遍存在的
Dharamsala达兰萨拉 位于印度北部喜马偕尔邦西北山区
Gruesome adj.可怕的, 可憎的, 令人厌恶的

xihucaibird

5月23日The
world economy
Inflation's back
mugger n. [动]泽鳄; 在演出中做夸张的怪像的演员
prowl: v. /n. 潜行于…  潜行（偷偷摸摸地）
dodgy: adj. 躲闪的, 不可靠的,不合理的
feed into
anchor v. 使船稳定：把…固定住
stoke: v. 给（火或火炉）添加燃料，拨旺（火或火炉
perverse: adj.不正当的;执拗的，刚愎的
on the loose

Afghanistan
How the “good war” could fail
twist sb's arm: to persuade someone to do something they do not want to do
Pushtun: 普什图人，是阿富汗最大的族群，信奉回教逊尼派
pick off: 摘掉，出去
settle into
de facto: adj.事实上的, 实际的
detach: vt. 分开, 分离, 分遣, 派遣(军队)
on both counts
suborn v. 教唆：引诱（某人）犯法或做坏事；非法获取（证据等）
benighted: adj. 陷入黑暗的，蒙昧的
dearth n. 缺乏，不足
box in 如盒子一般地围起来,不让...通过
fork out v.支付, 放弃
shove n.<口>推, 挤；vt.<口>推挤, 猛推, 强使；vi.推
forlorn adj.被遗弃的；可怜的，悲惨的；无望的

xihucaibird

Spreading the atom
Stopping the wrong sort of chain reaction
May 22nd 2008
From The Economist print edition

throws up v. 呕吐, 猛地举起, 放弃, 产生, 使显眼
prickly adj. 多刺的；麻烦的；易怒的
Toshiba 日本东芝公司
Atomenergoprom 俄罗斯国有核能企业 (股份合作公司“原子能电力公司”)
staunch adj.可靠的：坚定可靠的；坚实的
hanker vi. 渴望, 追求
laxity n. 松弛，松懈
flagrant adj.非常的, 不能容忍的, 恶名昭著的, 公然的
dabble v. 弄湿, 弄水, 涉足
techy adj.易怒的,暴躁的
mullah n. 毛拉(伊斯兰教国家对老师,先生、学者的敬称)
transgression n. 违反, 犯罪, [地]海侵, 海进

West Bengal
Comrades in arms
May 22nd 2008 | DELHI
From The Economist print edition

West Bengal （印度）西孟加拉邦
goon n. 受雇暴徒, 打手；呆子, 愚笨者
mow n.干草堆, 谷堆v. 刈, 扫除, 收割庄稼, 扫倒 (mown)
mow down
铲除：大批毁灭如切割一般，如在战场上；战胜;
incinerate vi.把...烧成灰, 烧弃
musket n.步枪，火枪
boon n.恩惠, 实惠, 福利
beseech v.恳求, 哀求；急切地要求
fief n. 封地, 采邑
interminable adj.无限的, 冗长的

xihucaibird

ASEAN, Indonesia and Myanmar
Forcing help on Myanmar
May 22nd 2008
From The Economist print edition
ASEAN needs to play a bigger role in its region, and Indonesia a bigger role in ASEAN
THREE long weeks after a cataclysmic cyclone struck Myanmar, something approaching an international relief effort is at last under way. The grotesque reluctance of the ruling junta to allow foreigners to help the desperate Burmese has shredded whatever vestige of respect it enjoyed internationally. It had long lost it at home. The decisive push into a more co-operative stance seems to have come in private from China and in public from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional club that admitted Myanmar in 1997 and has been silently ruing the decision ever since.
For some in the region, this is a vindication of “the ASEAN way”, which favours brotherly advice over brow-beating, non-interference over intervention, and consensual deliberation over confrontational haste. They are wrong.
The agreement ASEAN forced on the junta this week is of course welcome. But in fact the unfolding catastrophe demonstrates that ASEAN's hands-off style is wholly inadequate. The “concessions” it has wrung from Myanmar's generals are too little, too late. ASEAN, and above all its biggest member, Indonesia, need to throw their weight around a bit more. Who knows how many lives have been lost as the generals blocked foreign aid and went ahead, in most of the country, with a farcical referendum on a new constitution designed to perpetuate their rule? Even now, far from enough help is getting through (see article). Many in the Irrawaddy delta area were malnourished anyway. The danger is high of a secondary disaster, of starvation and disease. The agreement with ASEAN will help lower this risk. But it still leaves unnecessary constraints on how much help the needy will get, how soon.
Indonesian lessons
The junta, perhaps genuinely ignorant in its remote capital city of how bad things are, believes the “emergency” is over, and the emphasis now should be on “recovery” and reconstruction. This helps explain why it has changed its tune somewhat on foreign aid—it believes that foreigners may find their worst fears misplaced; and it knows it needs billions of dollars for the recovery effort.
Also, however, the generals may fear the consequences of continuing to refuse aid. The very paranoia that made them deter foreign aid workers may feed delusions of foreign invasion. If ASEAN managed to convey to them that allowing aid in was a smaller threat to their rule than keeping it out, it is to be congratulated. The impetus seems to have come in part from ASEAN's own secretariat in Jakarta. This has traditionally been a feeble body of pen-pushers under a mild-mannered secretary-general, usually a senior regional official rewarded with the post as the crowning boondoggle in a career of not rocking the boat. But the present incumbent, Surin Pitsuwan, is rather different—a career politician, who, as Thailand's foreign minister, tried to steer ASEAN into a more activist role in troublesome member states, such as Myanmar and Cambodia. He is said to see the Burmese cyclone as the defining crisis of his tenure. If so, he is right, and deserves support.
The member states said to have been most supportive of an active ASEAN role are Singapore—always more attuned than the others to the group's international image—and also Indonesia. If this is a sign that Indonesia may be contemplating a regional role commensurate with its stature, it is to be welcomed. It has always, quietly, dominated ASEAN. Indeed, the block was formed in 1967 partly to tie Indonesia down in a Lilliputian web of regional commitments. Accounting for two-fifths of ASEAN's population and one-third of its GDP, it dwarfs the other nine members.
Under the 32-year dictatorship of Suharto, which ended ten years ago this week, Indonesia, in keeping with the traditions of Javanese statecraft, used its clout discreetly. Since the tyrant fell, it has hardly used it at all. This is a shame. Although others, notably Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, were more vocal exponents of “Asian values” of Confucian respect for the powers-that-be, Suharto was the poster child of the virtues of authoritarianism. Yet since his downfall, democracy has put down surprisingly deep roots (see article). Indonesia has become a different sort of model—of the transition from military to civilian rule, of openness and pluralism. It should use the influence it has in ASEAN both to promote these virtues, and to turn it into a club that enforces some minimum standards of decency on its members. However low those standards are set, Myanmar's junta, with its refusal to help save the lives of its own people, falls short.
东盟，印度尼西亚，缅甸
强制缅甸接受援助

东盟需要在东南亚地区发挥更大的作用；而印尼需要在东盟发挥更大的作用

强飓风袭击缅甸三周后，接近于国际援助的工作终于得以进行。执政的军政府拒绝国外人员进入国家帮助那些绝望的缅甸人民，这种有悖常理的做法已经使它在国际上受到的仅存一点尊重都丧失殆尽。在国内早已无受尊重可言。现在更加合作的态度看起来是中国私下里和东盟公开推动的结果。地区组织东盟1997年接纳缅甸加入以来，一直默默地后悔当初的决定。
对该地区的一些人来说，这正是“东盟方式”的一种证明，这种方式偏好亲切的建议而非指责，崇尚不干涉而非介入，倾向自愿商议而非草率对抗。这些都是错误的。
这个星期东盟达成强制军政府协议的当然倍受欢迎。但事实上，灾难发生以来的情况表明东盟不插手的做法根本起不到作用。从缅甸将军们那里获得的“妥协”太少，也太晚了。东盟以及最大的成员国印度尼西亚需要施加更大的影响力。就在他们限制外国救援进入，同时还一意孤行地在全国大部分地区进行闹剧般的对旨在延长其统治的新宪法的全民公投，谁知道又死了多少人了呢？即使现在，进入的援助还远远不够。在伊洛瓦底江三角地区的很多人都营养不良。发生饥荒和疾病流行的二次灾害的可能性很大。可是军政府对灾民需要多少援助，什么时候获得还设有不必要的限制。
印尼的教训
坐镇远处首都的军政府也许真的没有意识到情况有多么严重，它相信“紧急救援”已经结束，现在应该进入“恢复”和重建阶段了。这就解释了为什么它对外国援助的态度有所改变——因为它认为这样会使外国人觉得他们的担心是多余的；也明白它需要几十亿美元进行恢复重建工作。
然而，将军们也担心继续拒绝援助的后果。使他们禁止外国救援人员进入的多疑偏执也会助长担心外国入侵的臆想。如果东盟能设法向他们传达这样一个信息，那就是，比起阻止救援进入，允许救援的进入对他们的统治是个更小的威胁；那就值得庆幸了。这次的动力似乎部分来自于东盟设在雅加达的秘书处。东盟秘书处向来都是一个弱势机构，都是一些办公室工作人员，上面是一名举止温和的秘书长。秘书长一职通常都是该地区某个国家的高级官员担任，这个职位可以说是对他们任内安分守己的奖励。然而现任的这位大不相同，Surin Pitsuwan是一名职业政治家，他任泰国外交部长时曾试图推动东盟在对待某些问题较多的成员国，如缅甸和柬埔寨上采取更为积极主动的态度。据说，他把缅甸飓风看作是自己任期内的明确危机。如果真是这样，那么他是对的，也应该得到支持。
成员国当中表示最支持东盟扮演积极角色的是新加坡和印度尼西亚，比起其他成员国，新加坡总是同该组织的国际形象更加一致。如果这意味着印度尼西亚正在考虑承担同其国力、地位一致的角色，这可是件好事。印尼总是默默地领导着东盟。的确，1967年该组织成立部分原因就是为了在这个地区小国网里拴住印尼。印尼的人口和GDP分别占了东盟的五分之一和三分之一，使其它9国相形见绌。
苏哈托对这个国家长达32年的独裁统治，到这个星期已经结束了10年的。在他的统治下，印尼一直小心翼翼地使用着它的影响力，这符合特有的爪哇治国传统。而自从这位独裁者倒台后，印尼几乎就没有用过它的影响力。真是可惜。虽然该地区的其他领导人，比如新加坡内阁资政李光耀和马来西亚前总理马哈蒂尔是提倡对当局儒家式尊重的“亚洲价值观”的代言人，而苏哈托却是极权主义德行的典范。自从他下台以后，民主深深的扎根了。印度尼西亚成了另一类模范 —— 从军事统治过渡到民权治理，开放和多样性。它应该利用其在东盟的影响力既推广这些优点，同时也推动该组织对其成员国实行一些最低标准的行为准则。不管这些标准设的有多低，拒绝帮助拯救其人民缅甸军政府都无法企及。

cataclysm n.
地球表面上的巨变(如洪水, 地震等)
洪水, 泛滥
政治或社会上的任何巨变
渗出, 渗液; 猝变
rue n.<古>懊悔, 后悔, [植]芸香v.后悔, 悲伤, 懊悔
hands-off adj.不插手的, 不干涉的
farcical adj.引人发笑的,闹剧的,滑稽的
boondoggle vi.<美俚>做细小而无用的事n. 琐碎的工作

xihucaibird

Corruption in eastern Europe
Talking of virtue, counting the spoons
May 22nd 2008 | BRATISLAVA, BUCHAREST, SOFIA AND WARSAW
From The Economist print edition

puddle n.水坑, 一小池液体，胶土, vt.搅浊, 混凝；vi.捣成泥浆
acerbic adj.酸的, 尖刻的，苦涩的
doughty adj.强的, 刚强的, 勇敢的
paragon n. 模仿，典范
moot n.大会, 审议会adj.未决议的, 无实际意义的vt.提出...供讨论
doughty adj.强的, 刚强的, 勇敢的
head-on adj.正面的
Gazprom（俄罗斯天然气工业公司）
snag n./v. 障碍，阻碍
gangland n. 充斥盗匪的地区, 黑社会
gimmick n.
[口](赌具、魔术道具等的)暗机关, 秘密装置
骗人玩意儿; 骗局; [俚](产品广告)噱头
小发明; 决窍

Computers and the environment
Buy our stuff, save the planet
May 22nd 2008
From The Economist print edition

buzzword专门用语，术语：与某一特定领域或组织相联系，主要用于给外行之人加深印象的听起来重要的单词或短语
ether n. 天空醚, 大气, 苍天, [物]以太
corollary n. 必然的结果, 系, 推论
gigahertz n.千兆赫
teracalorie 兆兆(=10的12次方)卡；万亿卡
altruism n.利他主义, 利他

xihucaibird

Nepal
Goodbye to all that
May 29th 2008 | KATHMANDU
From The Economist print edition
The abolition of the monarchy may be the easy part for Nepal's government

AT 6.15pm the fountains were switched on. The water danced. The white-clad military band stood to attention. And waited. And waited. After 239 years of rule by the Shah royal dynasty, perhaps it was inevitable that the last few hours of waiting for the monarchy to be abolished and a republic set up should also be long and drawn-out. When the announcement came, it was greeted with cheers. Three bombs had gone off earlier in the day. Yet all things considered, the decision, momentous as it was, sparked neither bitter complaint nor intense celebration.
Perhaps the long period of violence and uncertainty beforehand had something to do with it. Nepal has seen a decade-long civil war; two postponed elections; a massacre of the royal family; the grabbing of absolute power by the king and the handing back of it again; and most recently, victory in elections by Maoist former guerrillas. Nepalis could be forgiven for being uncertain of what lies in store.
The country's constituent assembly voted to abolish King Gyanendra's house by 560 votes to 4. The king's unpopularity, among assembly members and the ordinary Nepalis who elected them in April, was well earned. In 1990, his brother, King Birendra, bowed to popular demands and became a constitutional monarch, attaining respect and affection as a result.
When the Maoists began their insurrection in the western hills in 1996, getting rid of the crown was not on their agenda. Yet Gyanendra alienated supporters by grabbing dictatorial powers in 2005, only to be forced to hand them back again after a clumsy attempted crackdown turned peaceful protests into nationwide strikes. Most Nepalis believe—without any evidence—that Gyanendra and his unpopular playboy son, Paras, were involved in the royal massacre of 2001 when Crown Prince Dipendra killed his immediate family, several other relatives and himself.
The royal family was once revered as the reincarnation of Hindu gods. But the massacre undermined faith in the monarchy in general, and turned Nepalis against this king in particular. Before he ascended the throne, Gyanendra had been a successful businessman. He will be allowed to stay in Nepal and return to commerce. His palace will become a museum.
But for the man who engineered the king's departure, tougher choices lie ahead. This is the leader of Nepal's Maoists, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Prachanda, which means “awesome”. Prachanda has long said he would become the first president of a Nepalese republic. He stands on the brink of achieving that ambition. His problems start then.
The Maoists are the biggest party, but do not have a majority. Nepal is led by a fractious coalition, which the Maoists want to widen by including regional parties from the south and south-east. That may make managing the coalition trickier.
The abolition of the monarchy is a first step in a much wider reform. Laws and even customs deemed to go against the country's status as a republic are to be repealed. Many politicians who supported Prachanda's demand to abolish the monarchy will not necessarily back proposals for what should replace it. For example, the parties of the south and south-east want extensive regional autonomy. Prachanda seems unlikely to give it to them.
He will also have to get to grips with the aftermath of the civil war. The former royal army is 90,000-strong. Nepal also has 23,000 Maoist ex-combatants kicking their heels in temporary camps. The Maoists want to merge the two forces. The army's high command is reluctant.
Then there are economic and social promises to fulfil. The Maoists want to push through land reform, emancipate the lower castes and seek foreign investment. With growth slowing, that would be hard enough by itself. Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown—and the breast that sports a presidential sash.

和那些说再见吧
废除君主制对尼泊尔政府来说还算容易

下午6点15分，喷泉打开了，水花舞动着，一身白装的军乐队立正站立着。除了等待，还是等待。沙阿王朝的统治已有239年的历史，也许等待君主制的废除，共和国的建立的最后几个小时也必然是漫长难耐的。当宣告这一消息时，人群欢呼雀跃。而今天早些时候已发生了三起爆炸。总的来看，这一决定，虽然意义重大，但既没有引发怨恨，也不足以欢庆。
这也许和之前的长期暴力和不确定性有些关系。尼泊尔经历了长达10年的内战；两度推迟选举；皇室屠杀血案；国王摄取了绝对权力，之后又重新归还；以及最近毛共前游击队在大选中胜出。经历了这么多事之后，尼泊尔人对未来充满疑虑是情有可原的。
该国的选民大会以560票对4票废除国王贾南德拉的王宫。对大会成员和在四月份选举他们的普通尼泊尔人来说，国王不得人心是完全应当的。1990年，他的兄长比兰德拉顺应了民众的要求，成为了立宪君主，赢得了人们的尊敬和爱戴。
1996年毛共人开始在西部山区发动起义，推翻王室并不是他们的目标。然而贾南德拉在2005年夺取了独裁统治权，支持者弃他而去；一次他试图镇压和平示威，结果适得其反，转变为全国性的罢工，之后他被迫交出权力。即使没有任何证据，大部分的尼泊尔人都认为贾南德拉和他同样不受欢迎的儿子帕拉斯同2001年的皇室血案有关，当时皇储迪潘德拉杀死了家族成员和其他几个亲属，之后自杀。
皇室家族曾被人们尊崇为印度神的化身。但是血案损害了君主在一般民众中的信念，使尼泊尔人尤其反对国王。在登基成为国王之前，贾南德拉曾是一个成功的商人。他被允许留在尼泊尔，重操就业。他的皇宫将成为一座博物馆。
但是那个一手导致国王下台的人面临着更多艰难抉择。他就是尼泊尔毛共的领导人普拉昌达，“令人敬畏”的意思。普拉昌达一直以来说自己会成为尼泊尔共和国的第一任总统。就在他抱负触手可及之时，问题也开始了。
尼共（毛主义）是最大的党派，但没有占多数。领导尼泊尔的是一个难以驾驭的联盟，毛共想扩大这个联盟，把南部和东南部的党派也包括进来。那么，管理这样一个联盟会更棘手。
废除君主制只是更大范围改革的第一步。那些被认为同共和国国家地位相冲突的法律甚至习俗都要被废止。许多支持普拉昌达废除君主制的政治家不一定会支持代替君主制的提议。例如，南部和东南部的党派要求广泛的地区自治。普拉昌达看起来不太可能给予他们自治权。
他还要处理好内战遗留下来的问题。前皇室军队有9万余人。尼泊尔同时还有2万3千多的毛共前战士在临时营地里候命。毛共希望合并两只军队，而军队最高统帅不太愿意。
接下来是要履行对经济和社会问题的承诺。毛共想进行土地改革，解放低层种姓阶级，寻求外国投资。而由于经济增长缓慢，这些本身就很困难。对这位头戴皇冠，胸前佩戴总统饰带的人来说前方并非坦途。

fractious adj. 易怒的, 倔强的, 脾气不好的
repeal v.废止, 撤销, 否定, 放弃, 废除n.废除, 撤销
kick one's heels v. 空等, 久等